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ENFORCING THE ENFORCEMENT CLAUSE:
CITY OF BOERNE v. FLORES CHIPS AWAY AT
CONGRESSIONAL POWER
Michael Van Arsdall'
It is well settled that our Federal Government is one of enumerated
powers. The enumerated congressional powers are itemized in Article I,
section 8 of the Constitution.2 In addition to the specificity of these
enumerated powers, the Constitution contains language that contem-
plates broader congressional authority.3 For example, the Necessary and
Proper Clause gives Congress the power to enact all laws which shall be
"necessary and proper" to effectuate, not only the enumerated powers of
Article I, section 8, but all other powers constitutionally vested in the
Federal Government.4  Moreover, the Supreme Court has expansively
interpreted constitutional provisions, such as the Commerce Clause,5 to
provide even greater congressional authority.' The Enforcement Clauses
+ J.D. candidate, May 1999, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
1. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("This govern-
ment is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.").
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Article I, section 8 of the Constitution begins with
precise language: "The Congress shall have Power To... " and proceeds to list various
congressional powers. Id. The first seventeen clauses of section 8 give Congress legisla-
tive authority over the following exemplary, but not exhaustive, list of powers: tax collec-
tion, establishment of post offices and roads, war declaration, regulation of currency, and
raise and support Armies and a Navy. See id.
3. See id. I, § 8, cls. 1, 18 ("The Congress shall have Power To ... make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof.").
4. Id art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
5. See id. art. I. § 8, cl. 3.
6. See generally Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-57 (1971) (extending the
Commerce Clause to regulating "loan sharking"); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
304 (1964) (holding that Congress "acted well within its [Commerce Clause] power" to
prohibit racial discrimination in restaurant seating); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (allowing Congress to use the Commerce Clause to pro-
hibit racial discrimination against hotel guests); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125
(1942) (holding that a local activity, not itself commerce, which has substantial effect on
interstate commerce, whether it be direct or indirect, is within the scope of the Commerce
Clause); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (deciding that the Commerce
Clause is broad enough to regulate hours and wages of employees in local manufacturing
activities); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding even in-
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of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, also referred
to as the Civil War Amendments,' further enable Congress to enforce the
provisions of those amendments by "appropriate legislation."8  This
phrase is another example of broad constitutional language open to ex-
pansive interpretation.9
Although some constitutional language is broad and many Supreme
Court interpretations have allowed Congress to exercise its power to the
fullest extent under such language, the Constitution does provide inter-
trastate activities that bear a close and substantial relationship to interstate commerce are
within congressional commerce power); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189
(1824) (defining commerce to mean intercourse, not merely buying, selling, and traffic)
(emphasis added). The Gibbons Court defined intercourse to include navigation. See id.
at 190. In fact, the Court in Gibbons held that every aspect of commerce is indicated by
the Constitution. See id. at 194.
7. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments are collectively referred
to as the Civil War Amendments because they were adopted shortly after the Civil War to
address the problems of slavery and emancipation. See GERALD GUNTHER &
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 420 (13th ed. 1997). These amend-
ments were enacted to counter the Southern Black Codes. See JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15.1, at 960 (5th ed. 1995). The Black
Codes were designed to keep blacks in slave-like conditions. See JAMES A. HENRETrA ET
AL., AMERICA'S HISTORY TO 1877 at 486 (1987). Every state of the former Confederacy
enacted some type of Black Code in an effort to retain blacks as agricultural laborers, un-
der conditions favorable to white landowners. See id.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; amend. XIV, § 5; amend. XV, § 2.
9. These amendments each contain an "enforcement clause" to provide Congress
with a means of exacting compliance with the provisions of the amendments. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropri-
ate legislation"); id. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); id. amend. XV, § 2 ("The Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
Shortly after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court defined the scope of
the amendment's section 5 enforcement power in the broad terms:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibi-
tions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality
of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or inva-
sion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879); see also City of Rome v. United States, 446
U.S. 156, 158 (1980) (stating that an extension of the Voting Rights Act for 7 years was
within congressional enforcement power); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)
(holding that legislation that deters or remedies constitutional violations is within the
scope of congressional enforcement power even if interferes with a legislative sphere of
autonomy formerly reserved to the States); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 133-35
(1970) (upholding a nationwide ban on literacy tests as a voting requirement, enacted to
combat nationwide discrimination, as within congressional authority); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (stating that section 5 "is a positive grant of legislative
power"); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (upholding the suspen-
sion of literacy test as a requirement for voting under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment).
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nal and external limits to Congress's power."° An internal limit on Con-
gress's authority is a specific textual prohibition stating what Congress
"shall not" do." The Constitution externally limits Congress, on the
other hand, by granting authority to the states or a different branch of
government. 2 Some argue that the enumeration of certain powers pre-
supposes the withholding of other powers. 3 A source of support for this
contention can be found in the Tenth Amendment, which specifically
withholds from the Federal Government all powers not delegated to it by
the Constitution in favor of the states or the people.' The separation of
powers contemplated by the Constitution is further evidence that the
framers intended to limit Congress's powers."
10. See infra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (defining internal and external con-
stitutional limits).
11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cls. 2-8. Article I of the Constitution proscribes Con-
gress from suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, passing a bill of attainder
or ex post facto law, giving preference to the ports of one state over another, or granting a
title of nobility. See id. The Bill of Rights also specifically prohibits certain actions by
Congress, i.e., establishing a religion or prohibiting the free exercise of religion, abridging
the freedom of the press, speech, or right of assembly, or to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances. See id. amend. I.
12. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III. The first three articles of the Constitution diffuse the
power of the Federal Government between the Executive, Judicial, and Legislative
Branches. See id. Moreover, the Tenth Amendment limits the Federal Government by
explicitly stating that whatever powers not constitutionally delegated to the Federal Gov-
ernment are withheld. See id. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.").
13. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,195 (1824) ("The enumeration pre-
supposes something not enumerated."). The first sentence of Article I, section 1 of the
Constitution also recognizes that some legislative power is beyond the scope of congres-
sional power. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. It states that only the legislative powers "herein
granted" are vested in the Federal Government. Id. (emphasis added).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (declaring that powers not delegated to the Federal
Government are reserved to the states or to the people); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 45
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982) (explaining the relationship between federal
and state governments). In the Federalist No. 45, James Madison provided good discern-
ment of the federal-state balance intended by the framers:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government,
are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are
numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external
objects, as war, peace, negociation [sic], and foreign commerce .... The powers
reserved to the several States will extend to all objects, which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
Id. at 313.
15. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 87 (stating that the drafters of 1787
protected against excessive concentrations of power in the Federal Government primarily
through the federal division of powers, and the diffusion of the Federal Government into
1998]
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Notwithstanding these explicit and implicit limits on congressional
power, until recently, the Supreme Court gave Congress expansive leg-
islative authority by (1) broadly interpreting the Commerce Clause; (2)
permissively defining what is "appropriate legislation" under the En-
forcement Clauses of the Civil War Amendments; and (3) narrowly con-
struing the Tenth Amendment.'6 In the mid-1980s, Congress began
passing sweeping legislation in a variety of areas that, if left in place,
would have further broadened the scope of congressional legislative
authority by redefining its enumerated powers under the Constitution.'7
A convincing example of this type of legislation is the Gun-Free School
three separate branches as well as through the explicit "shall nots" of the Bill of Rights).
16. See supra notes 6 and 9 and accompanying text (describing decisions broadly in-
terpreting the Commerce Clause and the Enforcement Clauses). See, e.g., City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456
(1976)) ("'[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it em-
bodies' places no restriction on Congress's authority "to enforce the Civil War Amend-
ments by 'appropriate legislation"'); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)
(stating that the Tenth Amendment is but "a truism"). For an excellent history of the
Tenth Amendment, see Anthony B. Ching, Travelling Down The Unsteady Path: United
States v. Lopez, New York v. United States, and the Tenth Amendment, 29 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 99 (1995).
17. See, e.g., The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb (1994) (protecting the Free Exercise Clause by requiring a compelling state inter-
est, employing the least restrictive means necessary, to justify a neutral, generally applica-
ble law which may directly or indirectly burden an individual's free exercise of religion);
see also The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994) (making it a
federal offense to knowingly possess a firearm in a school zone); Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C)(i) (1994) (containing a "take title"
provision which requires states to regulate according to congressional guidelines or accept
ownership of radioactive waste); The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (requiring state and local law enforcement officials to
run background checks on prospective handgun purchasers); WILLIAM A. KAPLIN, THE
CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 74 (1992). Professor Kaplin states
that since M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), Congress's constitutional
powers have been construed broadly. See id. Kaplin also provides a concise analysis of
liberal means/ends construction enunciated in M'Culloch which permits extensive con-
gressional power. See id.
For an excellent analysis of the unconstitutionality of RFRA based solely on infringe-
ment of state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment, see Patrick G. Kruse, Note, Free
Exercise Claims By Inmates In State-Owned Correctional Facilities: Is Application of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act Unconstitutional Under the Tenth Amendment?, 73 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 391, 426-30 (1996). Kruse argues that the dissenting opinions in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), and the major-
ity opinions in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991), evidence the Court's willingness to protect state sovereignty under
the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 427-28. Arguing prior to the decision in City of Boerne,
Kruse asserted that if the Court truly wanted to honor its purported interest in protecting
the fundamental principles of state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment, it must in-
validate RFRA. See id. at 430.
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Zones Act of 1990." Under that Act, Congress, utilizing the Commerce
Clause, prohibited possession of a firearm in school zones.' 9 Another in-
stance of vast congressional legislation is the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act of 1993 (RFRA)20 RFRA, enacted pursuant to the Enforce-
ment Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,2' permitted Congress, as
opposed to the Supreme Court, to interpret the substance of the Four-
teenth Amendment.2 In response, the Supreme Court reined in Con-
gress by more narrowly defining the legislature's enumerated powers and
consequently invalidated such sweeping legislation.23
City of Boerne v. Flores4 illustrates the Supreme Court's most recent
limitation of Congress's previously broad powers. In this decision, the
Court reined in Congress's exercise of its expansive enforcement power
under the Fourteenth Amendment." The Fourteenth Amendment pro-
hibits states from depriving any person of life, liberty or property, with-
out due process of law.26 As a means of ensuring compliance with these
prohibitions, the fifth section of the amendment, also known as the En-
forcement Clause, grants Congress the power to "enforce, by appropriate
legislation," the provisions of the amendment.27 The enforcement power
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q).
19. See id. ("It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a
place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.").
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
21. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox
into the Henhouse Under Cover of Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16
CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 371 (1994) (stating that the Enforcement Clause was invoked as
support for RFRA because there was no enumerated constitutional basis for its passage).
22. See City of Boerne v. Flores, _ U.S. _, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997) (stating that the
design of the Enforcement Clause does not permit Congress to decree the substance of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
23. See id. at 2172 (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeds con-
gressional power under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also
Printz v. United States, _ U.S. , 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997) (overturning the provision of
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that imposed federal directives on state chief
law enforcement officers on the grounds that Congress cannot, under the Commerce
Clause, require state officials to administer or enforce a federal program); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding the Gun-Free School Zones Act overstepped
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
188 (1992) (declaring the "take title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Pol-
icy Act to be outside Congress's enumerated powers and is inconsistent with the Tenth
Amendment).
24. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
25. See id. at 2172 (stating that even though congressional enforcement power is
broad, RFRA went beyond Congress's authority).
26. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879) (reiterating Congress's author-
ity to enact legislation, if not prohibited elsewhere in the Constitution, to ensure state
1998]
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has been interpreted by Congress and the courts as providing Congress
with broad power to deter or remedy constitutional violations. For
more than one hundred years the Supreme Court has upheld a wide
range of congressional legislation enacted under the Enforcement Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and under the almost identical Enforce-
ment Clauses of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.29 While this
clause is an expansive grant of power, it is not limitless.30 Considering the
Court's traditional deference to congressional legislation promulgated
under the Enforcement Clauses, City of Boerne, however, signifies an
emerging trend toward a more prohibitive stance.31
The Supreme Court in City of Boerne examined the question of
whether Congress, acting under the Enforcement Clause, had the
32 3authority to enact RFRA. RFRA prohibited the government" from
substantially burdening a person's free exercise of religion without first
demonstrating that the burden furthered a compelling governmental in-
terest, and that the interest was advanced by the least restrictive means
available. 4 Congress enacted RFRA specifically to overturn the Su-
preme Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith.35 RFRA, therefore, posed a significant constitutional
question as to whether Congress has the authority to overturn a Supreme
compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment).
28. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976) (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. at 346-48) (holding that Congress's enforcement power is limited to passing legisla-
tion which deters or remedies constitutional violations).
29. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing the reason the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments are often considered in a group as the Civil War
Amendments); supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the over 100 years of per-
missive legislation enacted under the enforcement powers of the Civil War Amendments).
30. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970) (stating that congressional en-
forcement power is broad but not unlimited).
31. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2162 (1997) (explaining that Con-
gress enacted RFRA by relying on the Enforcement Clause); see also infra notes 46-57 and
accompanying text (discussing a similar struggle between the Court and Congress over the
appropriate scope of the Commerce Clause).
32. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160. The Defendant, the City of Boerne, raised
the question of RFRA's constitutionality in successive court proceedings. See Flores v.
City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355, 356 (W.D. Tex. 1995); see also City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct.
at 2160.
33. RFRA defined "government" as any "branch, department, agency, instrumental-
ity, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States, a State, or
a subdivision of a State." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) (1994).
34. See id. at § 2000bb-1; see also infra note 137 and accompanying text (providing
relevant portions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
35. 494 U.S. 872 (1990)' see also infra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the
findings and purposes behind RFRA).
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Court decision." Essentially, Congress's attempt to protect the free ex-
ercise of religion through use of the Enforcement Clause was in direct
conflict with the Court's authority "to say what the law is."
3 7
The Supreme Court found RFRA unconstitutional.3" The Court held
that despite Congress's broad power under the Enforcement Clause,
RFRA exceeded the limits of this expansive grant of power and, there-
fore, violated the separation of powers and disturbed the necessary fed-
36. See generally The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R.
5377 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 2 (1990) (opening remarks of Rep. Edwards) ("The bill responds to
Employment Division v. Smith, a recent Supreme Court ruling that weakened the long-
held standard of review for religious freedom cases. H.R. 5377 restores the prior legal
standard."); id. at 11 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner, Jr.) (stating that the purpose of
RFRA is to reinstate the compelling interest test that had been the law prior to Smith); id.
at 28-29, 31-32, (statement of Rev. Dean M. Kelley, Counselor on Religious Liberty, Na-
tional Council of Churches) (remarking that RFRA's purpose is to reinstate the compel-
ling interest test recently abandoned by the Supreme Court); 139 Cong. Rec. E1216 (daily
ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of Rep. Margolies-Mezvinsky) (declaring that RFRA recti-
fies Smith, "which severely limits" religious freedom); see also infra note 134 and accom-
panying text (outlining the relevant portions of RFRA, along with the summary and pur-
pose sections of the House and Senate reports); see generally Abner J. Mikva & Jeff
Bleich, When Congress Overrules the Court, 79 CAL L. REV. 729 (1991); infra notes 242-44
and accompanying text (discussing origins of judicial authority and review).
City of Boerne is not the only recent instance where Congress has passed legislation spe-
cifically to overturn a decision of the Supreme Court. See United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d
667, 691-92 (5th Cir. 1997) (DeMoss, J., dissenting). One of the purposes of the Freedom
of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 was to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993). See Freedom of Access to
Clinics Act of 1994 (FACE), Pub. L. No. 103-259, § 2, 108 Stat. 694, 694 (stating that the
purpose of the Act is to provide federal remedies for conduct threatening reproductive
services). The Findings and Purpose section of the Senate Bill, later adopted into the Act,
expressed the specific desire to return to the federal courts the power to enjoin behavior
preventing access to abortion clinics, which was taken away in the Bray decision. See id.
Judge DeMoss noted in his dissenting opinion, that the same Congress that passed FACE
also passed RFRA. See Bird, 124 F.3d at 691.
37. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (stating that RFRA's control of cases and
controversies was beyond congressional authority and conflicted with the judiciary's duty
to say what the law is); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (holding
that "[I]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is.").
38. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172. The controversy in City of Boerne arose
when the Archbishop of San Antonio gave St. Peter Catholic Church permission to en-
large the physical structure of the church to accommodate a growing congregation. See id.
at 2160. The Boerne City Council, however, subsequently passed an ordinance requiring
the Historic Landmark Commission to preapprove construction affecting buildings within
the city's historic district. See id. Following the passage of this ordinance, the Landmark
Commission subsequently denied the church's application for a building permit to enlarge
the church, and the City Council denied the church's appeal. See id. The church filed suit
claiming that the city ordinance was unconstitutional and violated RFRA's compelling
interest test. See id.
19981
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eral-state balance intended by the Framers.39 This holding illustrates the
Court's retreat from an expansive reading of the Enforcement Clause
toward a narrower reading that limits attempted exercises of congres-
sional authority to reinterpret the Constitution through dubious legisla-
40tion.
This Comment will demonstrate that the Court's decision in City of
Boerne v. Flores displays the Supreme Court's recent tendency to curtail
the traditionally expansive sources of congressional power. Part I of this
Comment provides an overview of recent decisions that illustrate the
Court's resurrection of the Tenth Amendment, and its willingness to
limit congressional commerce power.4' Part II, in contrast, examines Su-
preme Court decisions that support Congress's broad enforcement pow-
42ers under the Fourteenth Amendment. Part III analyzes in detail the
Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,43 and, in order to appreciate
the nature of the rights RFRA was intended to protect, also discusses the
environment that led to RFRA's enactment. Finally, Part IV of this
Comment submits that the decision in City of Boerne is representative of
a recent trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence circumscribing Congress's
power to interpret the Constitution under the veil of legislation." This
trend is particularly noticeable in the areas of Commerce Clause and
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, to which this Comment will draw par-
allels. The primary focus of this Comment, however, is the newest
method of judicial curtailment under the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This Comment concludes that the Supreme
Court's trend toward restrictions of Congress's legislative power is re-
storing the originally intended separation of powers and the proper fed-
39. See id. at 2172.
40. See discussion infra Part IV; see also infra note 220 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court's trend toward curtailing broad congressional powers under
the Enforcement Clause).
41. See discussion infra Part II.A.
42. See discussion infra Part II.B.
43. See discussion infra Parts II.E.1-3.
44. See discussion infra Part IV; see also United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 691 (5th
Cir. 1997) (DeMoss, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Judge DeMoss argued that
the Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), limiting con-
gressional power under the Commerce Clause, and in City of Boerne, explaining the limi-
tations of the powers granted under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, indicate a
significant trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence expressing a renewed awareness of the
fundamental principles of the Constitution. See id. Judge DeMoss explained that the
"Federal Government is a government of limited powers, federalism has a significant
place in constitutional analysis, and the separation of powers between the branches of the
Federal Government must be respected." Id.; see also supra note 23 and accompanying
text (discussing recent decisions limiting congressional power).
[Vol. 48:249
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eral-state balance. 5
I. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE NO LONGER RIDES ROUGHSHOD OVER
THE TENTH AMENDMENT
For a majority of this century, the Commerce Clause has been a sig-
nificant source of congressional power.46 As the economic pressures of
the early 1930s created a need for a national solution to the Great De-
pression, the Commerce Clause became an increasingly attractive source41 47
of regulatory authority. Since 1937,8 the United States Supreme Court
has broadly construed the commerce power to sustain a wide range of
congressional actions.4 ' The Court has used the Commerce Clause to en-
force civil rights legislation," to regulate activities of state agencies, and
45. See discussion infra Part V.
46. See KAPLIN, supra note 17, at 75 (stating that "[t]he commerce power is the most
frequently invoked of all Congress' [sic] domestic regulatory powers").
47. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 176. Professors Gunther and Sulli-
van point out that many New Deal provisions derived their authority from the Commerce
Clause because the problems of the Great Depression were economic, "and the Com-
merce Clause was the enumerated power most directly concerned with business and eco-
nomic, or commercial matters." Id. (quoting Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and
the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 646 (1946)). In the famous
"sick chicken" case, Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), Chief
Justice Hughes opined that "[e]xtraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitu-
tional power." 295 U.S. at 528 (footnote omitted). Justice Cardozo concurred with Chief
Justice Hughes, and warned that if Congress were allowed to regulate intrastate activities
because the economic circumstances of the Great Depression presented the need, it could
mark the "end of our federal system." Id. at 554 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
48. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding, for the
first time, that Congress may regulate intrastate activities that have a close and substantial
relationship to interstate commerce).
49. See KAPLIN, supra note 17, at 76. For a more complete review of the history of
the Commerce Clause and the Supreme Court's decisions in this area, see Rachel E.
Smith, Note, United States v. Lopez: Reaffirming the Federal Commerce Power and Re-
membering Federalism, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1459 (1996).
50. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (up-
holding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304
(1964) (reaffirming the constitutionality of Title II). Additionally, the Commerce Clause
has been extended to cover legislation pertaining to
gambling; to criminal enterprises; to deceptive practices in the sale of products;
to fraudulent security transactions; to misbranding of drugs; to wages and hours;
to members of labor unions; to crop control; to discrimination against shippers;
to the protection of small business from injurious price cutting; to resale price
maintenance; to professional football; and to racial discrimination by owners and
managers of terminal restaurants.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 257 (citations omitted).
51. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985) (up-
holding the Fair Labor Standards Act).
19981
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to enforce federal criminal laws." Furthermore, challenges to these con-
gressional regulations, based on the state sovereignty principle embodied
in the Tenth Amendment, have generally been unsuccessful.
53
The Supreme Court's decisions in New York v. United States, 54 United
States v. Lopez, 5  and Printz v. United States56 indicate a decrease in con-
gressional commerce power with a corresponding strengthening of the
Tenth Amendment 7 In 1992, the Supreme Court held, in New York v.
United States, that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from forc-
ing a state to carry out a federal regulatory program.5 8 The Court further
curtailed congressional commerce power in 1995 when it decided United
States v. Lopez. Without relying on the Tenth Amendment, the Court in
Lopez held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded con-
gressional commerce power. 9 Significantly, Justice Thomas, in his con-
currence, called for a modification of Supreme Court Commerce Clause
jurisprudence at an appropriate future juncture.6° The Court continued
52. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 351 (1971) (upholding the Crime Control
Act); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-57 (1971) (upholding Title II of the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act which made "loan sharking" a federal crime); United States
v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 452 (1953) (plurality opinion) (upholding the
Gambling Devices Act).
53. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (stating that the challenge to
congressional authority to regulate shipments of goods manufactured by workers earning
less than minimum wage was insufficient based on the Tenth Amendment because the
Tenth Amendment is "but a truism"); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 7, §
4.10(d), at 168-94 (discussing in detail federal regulation of state and local government en-
tities).
54. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
55. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
56. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
57. See id. at 2384 (extending the decision in New York, prohibiting compelled state
enforcement of federal regulatory programs, to prevent Congress from employing the
Commerce Clause to directly conscript state officials for federal purposes); Lopez, 514
U.S. at 565-66 (stating that although congressional commerce power does cover many
commercial activities, it does not extend to "every aspect of local schools"); New York,
505 U.S. at 177 (stating that take title provision was inconsistent with the federal structure
because the provision exceeded congressional commerce power and violated the Tenth
Amendment).
58. See New York, 505 U.S. at 188. The Court stated that the Tenth Amendment ex-
plicitly reserved to the States a "residuary and inviolable sovereignty." Id. (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 39, p. 245 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). The Court also held that although the
outer limits of state sovereignty may be uncertain, it does not permit the Federal Govern-
ment to compel state administration of a federal regulatory program, See id.
59. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. The Court held that the possession of a gun within
1,000 feet of a school did not constitute an economic activity that could substantially affect
interstate commerce. See id.
60. See id. at 602 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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this restrictive trend in 1997 with its decision in Printz v. United States. 61
In Printz, the Court held that Congress could not circumvent the Court's
decision in New York v. United States by directly conscripting state offi-
cers to implement a federal regulatory program when Congress was pro-
hibited from compelling state governments to enact such programs them-
selves.62 Echoing his earlier remarks, Justice Thomas stated that the
Court must "temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence., 63
As a whole, these cases are evidence of the Court's willingness to curb
a traditionally broad source of congressional authority.64 Recently, this
trend, illustrating a restrictive posture toward congressional authority
over state action, is also evident in the Enforcement Clause legislative
65
arena.
II. THE TRADITIONALLY BROAD SCOPE OF THE ENFORCEMENT POWER
Congressional enforcement power is derived from the Enforcement
Clauses of the Civil War Amendments. 66 Each of these amendments
provides Congress the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of the amendment. 6' As early as 1879, the Court defined Con-
gress's enforcement power to include any legislation that tended to en-
force state compliance with the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.68 The enforcement power was understood further to permit any
legislation likely to secure "perfect equality of civil rights" to all per-
sons. Four years later, in the Civil Rights Cases,7 ° the Court stated that
61. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
62. See id. at 2384.
63. Id. at 2385.
64. Compare supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text (discussing expansive con-
gressional commerce power), with supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text (discussing
recent limitation of the Commerce Clause).
65. See infra Part III.D (discussing City of Boerne v. Flores and the Supreme Court's
unwillingness to allow Congress to rely on the Enforcement Clause as a means of circum-
venting the Court's previous ruling in Smith).
66. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the enforcement provisions of
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments).
67. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2.
68. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879) (holding that any legislation
enacted to ensure compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment and to provide equality of
civil rights is appropriate under the Enforcement Clause).
69. See id. at 346.
70. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Civil Rights Cases refers cumulatively to United States v.
Stanley, United States v. Ryan, United States v. Nichols, United States v. Singleton, and
Robinson & Wife v. Memphis and Charleston R.R. Co. See id. All of these cases ques-
tioned the constitutionality of the first and second sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.
See id. at 8-9.
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the Enforcement Clause empowered Congress to pass all laws necessary
and proper for abolishing the incidents of slavery.7
The modern Supreme Court first dealt with the enforcement power in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach,72 where it qualified Congress's authority,
holding that in order to "enforce" the provisions of the Fifteenth
Amendment, congressional action must be construed as "remedial."" In
a subsequent case, Katzenbach v. Morgan,74 the Court maintained the
breadth of congressional enforcement power by affirmatively holding
that the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "is a posi-
tive grant of legislative power" to Congress.7  The Court has further
clarified that any legislation that "deters" or remedies constitutional
violations of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment is within the
scope of congressional enforcement power.76 The power to deter viola
tions, in addition to remedying them, implies that Congress can legislate
in a preemptive or anticipatory fashion as opposed to merely a corrective
one.77 In this line of cases, the Court also found that the Enforcement
Clause permitted federal legislation that infringed into spheres of state
78
autonomy.
The Court re-articulated this expansive definition of Congress's en-
• 79
forcement power in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. In Fitzpatrick, the Court held
71. See id. at 20; see also Donald Francis Donovan, Toward Limits on Congressional
Enforcement Power Under The Civil War Amendments, 34 STAN. L. REV. 453, 458 (1982).
Donovan makes a compelling argument that the framers use of the term "appropriate" to
qualify the enforcement power, which is the same term used by Chief Justice Marshall to
define the necessary and proper clause, suggests that the enforcement power should be
given comparable scope. See id.
72. 383 U.S. 301 (1966); see also GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 984-85 (dis-
cussing "substantive" versus "remedial" aspects of the enforcement power).
73. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326.
74. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
75. See id. at 651.
76. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. at 346-48). "[T]he Constitution now expressly gives authority for congressional inter-
ference and compulsion in the cases embraced within the Fourteenth Amendment. It is
but a limited authority, true, extending only to a single class of cases; but within its limits it
is complete." Id. See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2163 (1997) ("Legisla-
tion which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Con-
gress enforcement power .... ").
77. See WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 541 (Barnes &
Noble, 1996) (defining "deter" as "1. to discourage or restrain from acting or proceeding;.
. 2. to prevent..."); id. at 1629 (defining "remedy" as "2. something that corrects or re-
moves an evil of any kind") (emphasis added).
78. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455 (stating that previous cases "sanctioned intrusions
by Congress... into the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres").
79. See id. at 456 (allowing Congress to grant federal courts the authority to hear pri-
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that the scope of the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
was broad enough to overcome the restrictions of the Eleventh Amend-
ment.8° The Eleventh Amendment protects the principle of state sover-
eignty by prohibiting federal courts from hearing suits in law or equity
commenced by a citizen of one state against the government of another
state.8 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,8' enacted under Con-
gress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power, granted federal
courts the authority to award damages in favor of citizens against state
governments. The question addressed by the Court in Fitzpatrick was
whether the enforcement power allowed Congress to authorize federal
courts to award money damages to private individuals in discrimination
cases, despite the guarantee of state sovereign immunity afforded by the
Eleventh Amendment.84
The Fitzpatrick Court resolved this issue by closely examining the text
of the Fourteenth Amendment and interpreting the Enforcement Clause
as a broad grant of congressional power." The Court's analysis divided
the amendment into two parts: (1) the substantive provisions of section 1,
expressly directing the states as to what they shall not do; and (2) the
regulatory provision of section 5, allowing Congress to "enforce" the
provisions of section 1 by "appropriate legislation., 86  The Court con-
cluded that these two parts, taken together, were intended to be "'limita-
tions on the power of the States and enlargements of the power of Con-
gress.' ' 87 In essence, this interpretation tipped the balance of power
away from the states and toward the Federal Government by holding
vate suits against states or state officials, thereby circumventing the Eleventh Amend-
ment).
80. See id. (holding that when Congress acts pursuant to section 5, it has plenary leg-
islative authority within the terms of the grant, particularly since the substantive provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment contain significant limitations on state authority).
81. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.").
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000f.
83. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 447,
84. See id. at 448. The Court stated that
[t]he principal question presented by these cases is whether, as against the shield
of sovereign immunity afforded the State by the Eleventh Amendment, Congress
has the power to authorize federal courts to enter such an award against the State
as a means of enforcing the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth 'Amend-
ment.
Id. (citations omitted).
85. See id. at 453.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 454 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879)).
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that every grant of federal power is carved out of what once was a tradi-
88tional sphere of state power.
In City of Rome v. United States,89 the Court further expanded congres-
sional enforcement power under the Civil War Amendments by permit-
ting regulation of electoral laws that were absent of discriminatory intent,
but had a discriminatory effect.9" In City of Rome, the Court stated that
even if the Fifteenth Amendment only prohibited purposeful discrimina-
tion, its Enforcement Clause was broad enough to allow congressional
regulation of those laws that have a discriminatory effect as well.91 By
approving as "remedial" a law not within the scope of the amendment
itself, the Court essentially allowed Congress to determine the scope of
the Civil War Amendments rather than simply enforcing them.92 To-
gether, Morgan, Fitzpatrick, and City of Rome illustrate the Supreme
Court's deferential position toward Congress's authority to enact legisla-
tion purporting to enforce the Civil War Amendments.93
88. See id. at 455.
89. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
90. See id. at 177.
91. See id.
92. See Donovan, supra note 71, at 469; GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
983 (12th ed. 1991) (arguing that "if the 'remedial' power is as broad as Rome suggests,
Congress, in many circumstances, may be able to play a very significant role in giving ef-
fective meaning to constitutional rights without any need to resort to the 'substantive'
[protections of the amendments]").
93. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2163 (1997). For further elucidation
of the Court's historically accommodating position toward congressional enforcement
power under the Fourteenth Amendment, one should examine the Court's decisions in-
terpreting the analogous Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment. See Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) ("Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment grants
Congress a similar power to enforce by 'appropriate legislation' the provisions of the [Fif-
teenth A]mendment."); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (uphold-
ing enactment of the Voting Rights act as constitutional under the Enforcement Clause of
the Fifteenth Amendment). In City of Rome v. United States, the Court held that legisla-
tion attacking racial discrimination in voting need only be "appropriate" to come within
the purview of the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment. 446 U.S. at 177.
The Court used this method of analysis in City of Boerne. The majority distinguished,
however, the substantive scope of the two amendments, permitting an opposite outcome.
See id. The.Fifteenth Amendment protects the rights of citizens to vote regardless of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. The Fifteenth
Amendment also provides Congress with an enforcement power identical to the Four-
teenth Amendment. Compare id. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."), with id. amend. XV, § 2
("The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."). In a
number of cases, the Supreme Court upheld restrictions placed upon the states by the 1970
amendments to the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1 (1994), which limited the con-
stitutional authority of the States to administer their own elections. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 4; see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (declaring that the
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III. RFRA, CITY OFBOERNE, AND STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN
ENFORCEMENT AND SUBSTANCE
A. Religious Freedom and the Compelling Interest Test.- The Environment
Leading to RFRA
In order to understand RFRA's impact on congressional authority and
religious freedom, it is helpful to examine briefly the Court's prior deci-
sions involving the Free Exercise Clause. This summary will help illus-
trate the ultimate conflict in City of Boerne: an individual's First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion versus congressional en-
forcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment. Sherbert v.
Verner" and Wisconsin v. Yoder9 5 are two important decisions that pro-
vide analytic frameworks for appreciating the Court's subsequent hold-
ing in Smith. The Court's holding in Smith, in turn, led to the enactment
of RFRA.96 These decisions provide the standard of judicial scrutiny ap-
plied to laws that infringe upon an individual's free exercise of religion.
97
In Sherbert, the plaintiff, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist
Church, was discharged for her refusal to work a six-day work week that
included Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her religion.98 The issue in Sher-
enforcement power of the Civil War Amendments were specifically designed to expand
federal power and to intrude on state sovereignty); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117-
18 (1970) (prohibiting literacy tests, abolishing state durational residency requirements,
and providing for absentee balloting in presidential elections was with within congres-
sional enforcement power); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 337 (1966)
(upholding several provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965). In City of Rome, the
Court went so far as to state that the specific purpose of the Enforcement Clauses of the
Civil War Amendments was to tip the balance of federalism away from the states in favor
of the Federal Government. 446 U.S. at 179; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 7,
§§ 15.1-.12 at 960-85 (reviewing congressional enforcement power under the Civil War
Amendments).
94. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
95. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
96. See infra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative purpose of
RFRA).
97. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 (holding that "only those interests of the highest order
and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion"); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (stating that a mere rational relationship to some col-
orable state interest is insufficient to justify infringements of paramount interests such as
freedom of religion).
98. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399. As a member of the Seventh-day Adventist
Church, appellant was fired and subsequently unable to obtain other employment due to
religious convictions that prohibited her from accepting Saturday employment. See id.
The South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act provided in relevant part that eli-
gibility for unemployment benefits was conditioned on ability and availability for work.
See id. at 399-400. Further, the Act indicated that a claimant was ineligible for benefits
"[i]f... he has failed, without good cause ... to accept available suitable work when of-
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bert was whether the South Carolina Employment Security Commission
could deny the plaintiff unemployment compensation based upon the
Commission's finding that the plaintiff was "unavailable" for work, pur-
suant to the guidelines of the South Carolina Unemployment Compensa-
tion Law of 1936. 9 The Supreme Court held that the South Carolina law
was unconstitutional because it required an individual to abandon his re-
ligious convictions respecting the day of restia The Court applied the
strict scrutiny standard of review to the law at issue in Sherbert.1 1 Under
Sherbert, once an individual demonstrated a substantial burden'o° on his
fered him by the employment office or the employer .... See id. at 400 n.3 (emphasis
added).
99. See id. at 400-01. The law provides in part that in order to be eligible for unem-
ployment benefits, a claimant must be "able to work and is available for work," S.C. CODE
ANN. § 41-35-110(3) (Law Co-op. 1986), and shall be considered ineligible if claimant has
failed, "without good cause," to accept available suitable employment. Id. § 41-35-120(3).
100. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410.
101. See id. at 406 (holding that a mere rational relationship is insufficient, and that a
compelling interest is necessary before free exercise may be infringed).
102. See id. at 403. The Court noted that a merely incidental, as opposed to a substan-
tial, burden of free exercise may be justified by a compelling state interest. See id. In or-
der to determine whether a law violates the strict scrutiny standard, courts first examine
what constitutes a "substantial burden." See Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d
168, 171 (4th Cir. 1995) (declaring that the first step in analyzing a claim under strict scru-
tiny is to look first a whether a substantial burden has been placed upon the free exercise
of a sincerely held religious belief, and then examine whether the state can justify that
burden). The Supreme Court has held that a law or policy which merely "operates so as to
make the practice of [an individual's] religious beliefs more expensive," does not amount
to a substantial burden. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961) (plurality opinion).
Some courts have found that a substantial burden occurs only when an individual is com-
pelled to engage in conduct forbidden by his religion, or forced to abstain from action
mandated by his religion. See Goodall, 60 F.3d at 172-73; see also Woods v. Evatt, 876 F.
Supp. 756, 762 (D.S.C. 1995) (holding that a substantial burden exists when inmates are
coerced into violating their religious beliefs, or they are compelled by threat of sanctions
to refrain from religious conduct).
Prior to the Supreme Court's declaration in City of Boerne that RFRA was unconstitu-
tional, the circuits were split concerning whether the courts should consider the "central-
ity" of a particular belief in determining the existence of a substantial burden. See Stuart
Circle Parish v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 1225, 1238 (E.D. Va. 1996) (com-
paring the "centrality" factors used by the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, with the
Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits that refused to consider centrality when determining
whether a burden on religion was substantial). The narrow definition of substantial bur-
den adopted by the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits examines only whether there has
been "compulsion of that which is forbidden or the compulsory restraint of something
compelled" by one's religion. Id. at 1238 n.3. The broader definition used by the other
circuits considered whether the conduct or expression affected is a "central tenet of a per-
son's religious beliefs." Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) cert. granted
and vac., 118 S. Ct. 36 (1997); see also Turner-Bey v. Lee, 935 F. Supp. 702, 703 (D. Md.
1996) (considering whether a particular practice is obligatory or merely encouraged by a
religion).
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free exercise of religion, the State would need to show more than a mere
rational relationship between the governmental interest and the means
of implementation in order to justify its actions.0 3 In order to prevail, the
state would need to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest to
justify a substantial infringement of a fundamental right such as the free
exercise of religion.'O South Carolina's asserted interest was to prevent
fraudulent unemployment claims, which could dilute the unemployment
compensation fund and present scheduling hardships for employers.105 In
Sherbert, the Court did not find the State's claim concerning the mere
possibility of fraud compelling.' 6 In dictum, the Court assumed argu-
endo that even if the State's purported interest was compelling, in order
to survive strict scrutiny review,'O° the State must prove that no alterna-
tive means of regulation would further its professed interest without bur-
dening religious freedom °10 8 This standard of review applies if the pur-
pose or effect of the questioned law infringed upon the observance of
one or all religions, even if the infringement is indirect' °9
The Court reinforced the strict scrutiny standard articulated in Sher-
bert in its subsequent ruling, Wisconsin v. Yoder.1 In Yoder, the Court
addressed whether a state's vital interest in universal education would
prevail when balanced against an individual's First Amendment rights."'
The specific conflict in Yoder concerned whether Wisconsin could en-
force mandatory school attendance for all children until age sixteen, even
103. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 407.
106. See id.
107. Courts employ differing levels of judicial scrutiny depending on the nature of the
right at issue in a particular case. See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law §§ 812-17
(1998). In the areas of economic and social regulation, courts exercise restraint. See id. §
813. Legislative enactments are presumed constitutional, and a challenged statute must be
only "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Id.
Alternatively, legislation involving a fundamental right receives active and critical judi-
cial analysis. See id. § 815. The judicial standard employed is referred to as strict scrutiny,
and in such cases, the state has the burden of justifying the law with a compelling govern-
mental interest. See id.
For a thorough explanation of the different levels of judicial scrutiny, see generally Jef-
frey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny,
45 OHIO ST. L. J. 161 (1984) (discussing the origins of the multi-level system of judicial
scrutiny, outlining criticisms of and flaws in multi-level scrutiny, and advocating for a uni-
fied system of review).
108. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
109. See id. at 404.
110. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
111. Seeid.at207.
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though the Amish religion prohibited Amish children from being for-
mally educated beyond the eighth grade.112 While the Court acknowl-
edged that providing public education is an interest of paramount impor-
tance to the states, the majority found that a state's interest in universal
education was not absolute.'13
This decision turned on the Court's finding that the application of a fa-
cially neutral law may still impermissibly interfere with an individual's
free exercise of religion."4 Thus, in Yoder, the Court acknowledged that
an individual's constitutional right to free exercise could exempt him
from laws of general applicability, even if the burden on his fundamental
right was indirect."'
B. Smith: A Line Is Drawn Over Religious Freedom
As opposed to its previous free exercise decisions in Sherbert and Yo-
der, the Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny standard of review in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith."6 This
action by the Court precipitated Congress's enactment of RFRA."
7
Smith again posed the question of whether an individual's right to free
exercise of religion was superior to the states' ability to enact laws of
general applicability."' As in Sherbert, the plaintiffs challenged a state's
refusal to pay them unemployment benefits."9 The plaintiffs were fired
from their jobs because they ingested peyote, a narcotic designated as a
controlled substance in Oregon, for sacramental purposes at the Native
112. See id.
113. See id. at 213 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (holding
that states do have the power to enforce reasonable regulations concerning duration of
education)); id. at 214 (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (holding that the duty of the state to
provide public education to its children must yield to the right of parents to provide
equivalent private education)).
114. See id. at 220. The Court described the "tight rope" that must be walked between
preserving the free exercise of religion, and avoiding the governmental establishment of
religion. See id. at 221. Enacting facially neutral laws, which apply equally to each citizen
regardless of one's religion, avoids the establishment of religion, but may at the same time
infringe on an individual's free exercise of religion. See id. at 220-21.
115. See id. at 220.
116. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see also id. at 884-85 (holding that the strict scrutiny standard
applied in the context of unemployment benefits in Sherbert should not be extended in
Smith to generally applicable criminal law).
117. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)-(b) (1994); see also infra note 134 and accompanying
text (discussing the legislative purpose behind the enactment of RFRA).
118. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (declaring the issue to be whether the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment allows the use of peyote, inspired by religion, to fall under
a general criminal prohibition against the use of peyote).
119. See id. at 875.
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American Church.12° The Oregon Department of Human Resources
Employment Division denied the plaintiffs' application for unemploy-
ment benefits, claiming the applicants were ineligible because they were
dismissed for work-related "misconduct.'..
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected the application of the
Sherbert test and held that a compelling governmental interest is unnec-
essary to justify religion-neutral laws of general applicability that may in-
directly burden the free exercise of religion. 2 In reaching this decision,
the Court explained its departure from prior case law by indicating that
strict scrutiny analysis is applicable only in situations where state unem-
ployment compensation was conditioned on an applicant's willingness to
disregard his religious beliefs in order to work. 1 3 According to the Smith
majority, Sherbert should not be interpreted broadly.124 Rather, Sherbert
stands for the limited proposition that where a state unemployment sys-
tem already has a system with provisions in place for individual exemp-
tions, the state may not refuse exemptions on the basis of "religious
120. See id. at 874. Oregon law considers peyote a "controlled substance," the know-
ing and intentional possession of which is considered a Class B felony. See id. The law
makes no exception for the "sacramental use" of the drug. See id.
121. See id. at 874.
122. See id. at 884-86.
123. See id. at 883 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)); Hobbie v. Unem-
ployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (applying strict scrutiny to
the denial of unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist); Thomas v. Review Bd.
of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (applying strict scrutiny to a
ruling denying unemployment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness).
A review of the cases employing strict scrutiny analysis in the field of religious freedom
provides insight into the Court's traditional resolution of this issue. See Hobbie, 480 U.S.
at 141 (holding the denial of unemployment benefits to a member of the Seventh-day Ad-
ventist Church on the grounds that she refused to work on Saturday, her recognized Sab-
bath, must be subjected to strict scrutiny and could be justified only by proof of a compel-
ling state interest); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718 (holding that the denial of unemployment
benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who quit his job after being transferred to a department
which made tank turrets, may be a justifiable infringement of religious liberty only by
showing that the infringement is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state
interest). In situations involving taxation and the Selective Service Laws, the Court found
the strict scrutiny test satisfied because the government interest involved was so compel-
ling. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-60 (1982) (declaring that the overriding
governmental interest in refusing to allow denominational exemptions to social security
taxes, justified an imposition on the religious liberty of a member of the Old Order
Amish); Gillette v. United Sates, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971) (holding the requirement that a
conscientious objector under the Military Selective Service Act must be opposed to all
wars, not merely particular wars, was supported by a substantial government interest in
procuring the manpower necessary for military purposes).
124. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (noting various limitations on the Sherbert holding).
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hardship" without a compelling reason.125
In Smith, the Court rejected the contention that the level of scrutiny
afforded in Sherbert and Yoder should necessarily be extended generally
to freedom of expression claims."' The majority explained that prior
cases employing a strict scrutiny standard were not premised on the Free
Exercise Clause alone, but instead involved a combination of claims such
127as free exercise along with freedom of speech or press, or free exercise
and the rights of parents to educate their children.
The Court noted that even though the strict scrutiny requirement must
be applied in other situations (such as those involving race and speech)
before the government may accord different treatment, such a high stan-
dard was not applicable to situations involving free exercise. 12' The ma-
jority warned that applying strict scrutiny to all laws that inhibit an indi-
vidual's free exercise of religion would create a private right to ignore
generally applicable laws."" The Court also held that broad application
125. See id.; see also supra note 99 and accompanying text (outlining the conditions of
the South Carolina law at issue in Sherbert). The Court explained its holding in Sherbert
in part by pointing out that the statutory language there illustrated a "good cause" exemp-
tion. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. Therefore, the narrow interpretation of Sherbert by Jus-
tice Scalia in Smith implied that the free exercise of one's religion must qualify as a "good
cause," when such an exemption is included in the language of a particular law. This in-
terpretation of Sherbert in Smith does not mean that an exemption must be carved out for
free exercise, where one has not previously been provided.
Obviously, the disputed statutes in Smith and City of Boerne did not have a general
"good cause" proviso. In Smith, the only exception provided for the possession of a con-
trolled substance under Oregon law was if the substance had been prescribed by a medical
practitioner. See id. at 874. Likewise, no general exception was provided under the city
ordinance disputed in City of Boerne. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2160(1997). In City of Boerne, the ordinance authorized the Commission to regulate construc-
tion in historic districts, without any exceptions for religions or otherwise. See id.
In Yoder the Wisconsin statute requiring compulsory school attendance until the eighth
grade did not provide for any exceptions, however, the Court required one to be created.
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 240 (1972) (noting the difficult decision, and ad-
ministrative problems, attendant to creating an exemption). In Smith, Justice Scalia ex-
plained that the exception in Yoder was not created to accommodate the free exercise of
religion alone, but to oblige additionally the rights of parents to educate and raise their
children. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 n.1.
126. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
127. See id. (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940) (invalidating a
licensing system which provided the system administrator the authority to determine any
cause non-religious) and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113 (1943) (invalidating a
flat tax on the dissemination of religious literature)).
128. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invali-
dating mandatory school attendance laws as applied to the Amish)).
129. See id. at 885-86.
130. See id. at 886. The judicial philosophy of preventing individuals from possessing
the private right to ignore general laws was developed as early as the nineteenth century.
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of the strict scrutiny standard would create a judicially unworkable sys-
tem, even if strict scrutiny was applied only when government action
burdened conduct "central" to an individual's religion."' The Court de-
clared that it would be inappropriate for the judiciary to determine the
"centrality" of religious beliefs.'32 Ultimately, the Court based its deci-
sion in Smith on the determination that the continued application of the
Sherbert test, beyond the narrow scope of unemployment benefits, would
open the door to constitutionally required religious exemptions from
civic obligations of every imaginable kind.'33
C. RFRA: Congress Reverses the Court's Decision in Smith
Congress, acting under the Enforcement Clause, attempted through
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878). In Reynolds, the Court held
that interpreting the free exercise clause as to prevent government from regulating the re-
ligious "actions" of individuals would "permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."
Id.
131. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886.
132. See id. at 887 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982)). Justice
Scalia analogized that determining the "centrality" of religious beliefs prior to employing
the compelling interest test in the realm of free exercise, would be as inappropriate as de-
termining the "importance" of ideas prior to employing the compelling interest test in the
realm of free speech. See id. at 886-87. Justice Scalia questioned rhetorically what "prin-
ciple of law or logic" could be used in order to contradict what an individual believes to be
"central" to his personal faith. Id. at 887.
In an earlier free exercise decision, Justice Stevens strongly advocated keeping the
courts and the legislature "out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of differing
religious claims." United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). Justice Stevens argued that governmental involvement in determining the validity
of religious claims runs the risk of violating the Establishment Clause. See id.
The Court also refused to involve itself in determining what is central or indispensable
to a particular religion in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485
U.S. 439, 457-58 (1988). The Court held that engaging in these types of determinations
would force the Court "to rule that some religious adherents misunderstand their own re-
ligious beliefs." Id. at 458. The Court concluded, based on the Constitution and other
precedents, that this sort of determination was never an intended role for the judiciary.
See id.; see also Dayton Christian Sch. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 578 F. Supp. 1004,
1033 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (explaining that courts are ill-suited to engage in the scriptural in-
terpretation necessary to determine what is central to an individual's religious beliefs); su-
pra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the split in the circuits concerning whether
centrality is a factor in determining if an individual's free exercise has been substantially
burdened).
133. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 889 (citing various cases where plaintiffs sought exemption
from general laws based on free exercise principles: Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec-
retary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (exemption from social welfare legislation including
minimum wage laws); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (exemption from
compulsory military service); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (exemption
from child labor laws); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (exemption from traf-
fic laws)).
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legislation to reinstate the balance between the religious rights of the in-
dividual and the governmental interests of the states that existed prior to
the Smith decision.' RFRA's legislative purpose was to overturn the
Supreme Court decision in Employment Division v. Smith.'35 Generally,
RFRA's mandate was clear; "[g]overnment shall not substantially bur-
den a person's exercise of religion."'36 RFRA provides an exception to
the general rule that government may, however, burden a person's exer-
cise of religion if a compelling governmental interest exists and the bur-
den imposed represents the least restrictive means of furthering that in-
terest.1
37
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). The legislative findings of RFRA state in part:
Findings
The Congress finds that-
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an
unalienable right, secured its protections in the First Amendment to the Consti-
tution;
(2) laws "neutral" toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as
laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without com-
pelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court
virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on re-
ligious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and com-
peting prior governmental interests.
Purposes
The purposes of this chapter are-
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened;
and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substan-
tially burdened by government.
Id. § 2000bb.
135. See id.; see also supra note 134 and accompanying text (outlining the appropriate
provisions of RFRA and the "purpose" sections of the House and Senate reports).
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
137. See id. RFRA states that:
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental in-
terest.
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D. City of Boerne v. Flores: The Court Reverses Congress
In City of Boerne v. Flores,38 the Court considered the constitutionality
of RFRA, and focused particularly on Congress's authority to directly
circumvent a Supreme Court ruling. 9 The dispute in City of Boerne
arose when the Archbishop of San Antonio initiated plans to expand the
St. Peter's Catholic Church, located in Boerne, Texas. 40 Soon after, the
Boerne City Council passed an ordinance requiring preapproval by the
Historic Landmark Commission for all construction affecting buildings in
a historic district. 4' The Archbishop applied for a building permit that
the Landmark Commission denied based on the ordinance and the ar-
gument that the church was located in a historic district.4 2 The Arch-
bishop then filed suit in the District Court for the Western District of
Texas, challenging the denial of the building permit to enlarge the church
and seeking relief under RFRA."' The district court concluded, how-
ever, that the enactment of RFRA exceeded congressional enforcement
power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and denied the
Archbishop relief.'4 Reviewing the ruling on interlocutory appeal, the
Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that RFRA was constitutional.14' The
Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court, holding that: (1) RFRA did
not exceed Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; (2) RFRA did not upset the separation of powers; and (3) RFRA
did not violate the Tenth Amendment. 46 The Supreme Court reversed in
141
a six-to-three decision.
138. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
139. See id. at 2160-63, 2172.
140. See id. at 2160.
141. See id.
142. See id. The Church seated approximately 230 worshipers and was too small to
accommodate its growing parish. See id. Pursuant to City Ordinance 91-05, the Landmark
Commission proposed, and the City Council adopted, the designation of a Historic District
in Boerne, Texas. See Flores v. City of Boerne, Texas, 73 F.3d 1352, 1354 (5th Cir. 1996)
(Flores II), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). The St. Peter Catholic Church was not desig-
nated as a historic landmark but a portion of the church was within the Historic District.
See id. The Archbishop argued that only the faqade of the church was included in the Dis-
trict and that the faqade would not be affected by any enlargement plans. See id. On the
other hand, the city contended that the entire structure was affected. See id.
143. See Flores II, 73 F.3d at 1354; P.F. Flores v. City of Boerne (Flores 1), 877 F. Supp.
355 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
The church sought a judicial declaration that the ordinance violated the Constitution and
RFRA, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees. See Flores II, 73 F.3d at 1354.
144. See Flores I, 877 F. Supp. at 357-58.
145. See Flores 11, 73 F.3d at 1364.
146. See id.
147. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2159-60. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion
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1. The Majority Opinion: Reviving Smith
The Supreme Court decision in City of Boerne v. Flores148 held the en-
actment of RFRA exceeded Congress's enforcement power. A sub-
stantial portion of the majority opinion in City of Boerne addressed the
scope of Congress's enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,15° because Congress enacted RFRA specifically to overturn the
Supreme Court's decision in Smith.5 Specifically, the majority focused
on whether the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment en-
ables Congress to overturn a decision of the Supreme Court.152
Initially, the Court focused on Congress;s reaction to the decision in
Smith and its legislative intent in enacting RFRA"' The majority briefly
reviewed its rationale for refusing to apply the Sherbert compelling inter-
est test in Smith . 54 In City of Boerne, the Court reiterated Smith's hold-
ing that the Sherbert compelling interest test should be defined narrowly
of the Court, in which the Chief Justice and Justices Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsberg
joined; Justice Scalia joined in all but Part III.A.1. See id. at 2159. Justice Stevens filed a
concurring opinion. See id. at 2172. Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part, in
which Justice Stevens joined. See id. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Justice Breyer joined except as to a portion of Part I. See id. at 2176. Justices Souter and
Breyer each filed separate dissenting opinions. See id. at 2185-86.
148. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
149. See id. at 2160.
150. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2162-68 (Part III.A of the majority opinion fo-
cuses on the definition and scope of congressional enforcement power under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994); H.R. REP. No. 103-88 (1993) (describing the
summary and purpose of RFRA as a "respon[se] to the Supreme Court's decision in Em-
ployment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith by creating a
statutory right requiring that the compelling governmental interest test be applied in cases
in which the free exercise of religion has been burdened by a law of general applicability")
(footnote omitted); S. REP. No. 103-111, at 2 (1993) (stating the purpose of RFRA is to
"respond[] to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Hu-
man Resources of Oregon v. Smith by creating a statutory prohibition against government
action substantially burdening the exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability, unless the Government demonstrates that the action is the
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest") (footnote omit-
ted); see also supra note 134-35 and accompanying text (presenting the legislative purpose
supporting RFRA). For a detailed summary of the .legislative hearings, see Marci A.
Hamilton, supra note 21, at 360 n.8.
152. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2162 (discussing the limited nature of congres-
sional power as explained in M'Culloch v. Maryland's, and Marbury v. Madison's holdings
that the judiciary has the authority, to determine cases and controversies, not the legisla-
ture) (citations omitted); id. at 2172 (stating that "the Constitution is preserved best when
each part of government respects both the Constitution and the proper actions and deter-
minations of the other branches.").
153. See id. at 2160-62.
154. See id. at 2160-61.
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and that broadening the test's applicability would create an anomaly al-
lowing individuals to ignore the law.' The Court re-emphasized the dis-
tinction made in Smith that facially neutral, generally applicable laws
have only been held unconstitutional in cases where free exercise was
burdened along with other constitutional rights.'
In City of Boerne, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, initiated
his discussion of the merits with an analysis of the structure of govern-
ment provided by the Constitution.' Justice Kennedy reiterated that
"the Federal Government is one of enumerated powers"'58 and "that the
'powers of the legislature are defined and limited."" 9 Next, Justice Ken-
nedy examined the text of the Fourteenth Amendment in conjunction
with precedent to determine the scope of the Enforcement Clause.'
6
The majority concluded that the Enforcement Clause provided Congress
with broad, but not unlimited, powers.'1 Essentially, the Court inter-
155. See id. at 2161 (declaring that application of the Sherbert test to the facts in Smith
would have created "a constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of general applicability").
156. See id. at 2161 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (involving "the
right to the free exercise of religion [and] the right of parents to control their children's
education.")). The Court also reviewed the application of the Sherbert test to challenges
to state unemployment compensation rules. See id. at 2160-61 (citing Hobbie v. Unem-
ployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). The
Court explained that these cases survived constitutional scrutiny because the holdings
stood "'for the proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual excep-
tions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of religious hardship without a com-
pelling reason."' See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2161 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S., at 884).
For an in depth review of modern cases involving the Free Exercise Clause, see NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 7, § 17.8, at 1293-1310.
157. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2162.
158. Id. at 2162 (citing M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819)).
159. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)).
160. See id. at 2163 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) ("[Sec-
tion] 5 is 'a positive grant of legislative power' to Congress."). Justice Kennedy also noted
the broad scope of Congress's section 5 enforcement power. See id. (citing Ex parte Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879)). He explained that in order for legislation to qualify as
"enforcing" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, it must "deter[] or remed[y]
constitutional violations." Id. (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)). The
majority also cited numerous cases involving the parallel enforcement power under the
Fifteenth Amendment. See id. (citing City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980)
(holding that a seven-year extension of the Voting Rights Act was a constitutional use of
the enforcement power); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding five-year na-
tionwide ban on literacy tests and similar voting requirements for registering to vote);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966) (upholding ban on literacy tests aimed at
individuals schooled in Puerto Rico); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308
(1966) (upholding the suspension of literacy tests and other voting requirements under
congressional enforcement power)).
161. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2163 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
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preted the Enforcement Clause to permit congressional action, even in
legislative areas traditionally reserved to the states, provided the legisla-
tion in question deterred or remedied violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
a. The Majority Defines "Enforcement"
The Court clarified that the breadth of the Enforcement Clause is not
without limits. The language of the clause itself grants Congress only
the power to "enforce" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
64
The Court articulated further that the power to enforce does not confer,
nor imply, the power to define the scope of the Amendment.
The Court stated explicitly that Congress cannot enforce a constitu-
tional right by redefining the substance of that right.'" The Court con-
ceded that while it is often difficult to discern the distinction between
measures designed to enforce, measures that remedy or prevent uncon-
stitutional actions, and measures that substantively change the law itself,
such distinctions exist and must be observed. 67 To aid in making this dis-
tinction, the Court articulated a proportionality test to determine where
the line must be drawn. The Court held that in order for a law properly
to be considered enforcement, "[t]here must be a congruence and propor-
tionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
128 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.)).
162. See id. (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
163. See id. (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 128 ("As broad as the congres-
sional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited."). The Court also discussed the literal
meaning of the term "enforce," implying that the provision to be enforced is defined else-
where. See id. at 2163-64. "Enforc[ing]" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, by
definition may not include substantive revision of said provisions. See id. at 2164; see also
infra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing the literal definition of the verb "en-
force").
164. See id. at 2163; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
165. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164. Justice Kennedy used formal logic in his
examination of the distinction between "enforcing" particular provisions and altering the
substance of the provisions that Congress is attempting to enforce. See id. In other words,
if by attempting to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment those provisions
are given new meaning or scope, logically, the redefined provisions are no longer the pro-
visions of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
166. See id. ("[Congress] has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to de-
termine what constitutes a constitutional violation.").
167. See id.
168. See id. (stating that without "congruence and proportionality" between the injury
and the remedy, the intended remedial legislation "may become substantive in operation
and effect").
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adopted to that end."'69 In other words, the means selected to prevent or
remedy a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment must be appropriately
related to the desired result. The Court stated that laws without such a
connection would in fact be a substantive change in the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment, rather than a means of enforcing the amend-
ment's existing protections.
The Court reconfirmed that the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires legislation enacted under its Enforcement Clause
must be remedial, rather than substantive. 7' The Court noted that one of
the drafts of the amendment drew strong opposition... because it con-
tained a clause granting Congress the power to make all laws "necessary
and proper"'' to enforce the provisions of the amendment. On the other
hand, the debate surrounding the final draft, which gave Congress the
power to "enforce, by appropriate legislation," suggested that the legisla-
tors were satisfied that congressional power under the new language
would no longer be plenary but remedial.'74
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 2164-66 (discussing the legislative debates and draft language of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
172. See id. at 2164 ("The proposal encountered immediate opposition, which contin-
ued through three days of debate.").
173. See id. at 2164. The language of the draft amendment was as follows:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citi-
zens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection
in the rights of life, liberty, and property.
See id. (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866)).
174. See id. at 2165 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2286 (1866)). Ironi-
cally, almost fifty years before ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the debate
over whether to grant Congress the power to enact all "necessary and proper" legislation
as opposed to all "appropriate" legislation to enforce the amendment, Chief Justice Mar-
shall used these phrases interchangeably when defining the scope of congressional power.
See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 356-57 (1819). Chief Justice Marshall
noted that the word "necessary," in the constitutional context, does not mean indispensa-
ble, requisite, or essential, but instead means "appropriate." See id. (stating that when de-
ciding whether congressional actions are necessary and proper, the Court should deter-
mine if the actions are an "appropriate means to an end").
Preliminarily, the Court established that the Enforcement Clause granted only remedial
powers. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164, 2166-67 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 prescribing criminal
penalties for individuals who denied any person "the full enjoyment of" public accommo-
dations, on the grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment governed only State, not private
conduct); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (emphasizing that the reme-
dial nature of legislation enacted under the Enforcement Clause may be determined by
the history of the targeted problem, i.e. a flagrant history of voting discrimination in the
South)). The Court clarified the earlier decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan, however, that
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b. The Proportionality Test: Does RFRA Qualify as Enforcement?
After completely defining the scope of the Enforcement Clause, the
second half of the majority opinion applied the proportionality test to
RFRA to determine whether it was remedial or substantive in nature.175
The Court noted that RFRA would not necessarily be placed beyond the
scope of the Enforcement Clause if it were determined to be merely pre-
ventative in nature, as opposed to being aimed at a specific existing
law.'76 RFRA could have been found remedial if there was a "congru-
ence between the means used and the ends to be achieved.', 177 RFRA,
however, failed this test.178
could have been interpreted as conferring upon Congress the power to expand the rights
granted under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 2168 (conceding that the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, which ensured that persons who completed the sixth grade in Puerto
Rico could not be denied the right to vote, regardless of their ability to read or write Eng-
lish, approached a substantive change in the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment). The
interpretation that the Enforcement Clause conferred substantive legislative power, how-
ever, was not the only one. See id. The City of Boerne Court ruled that the language of
the Act could be interpreted as a remedial measure aimed at discrimination in governmen-
tal services. See id. For example, the decision upholding the Voting Rights Act seemed to
greatly expand the "scope" of the Fourteenth Amendment because this decision condoned
congressional control over the states' authority to control the times, places, and manner of
elections over which states had traditionally maintained exclusive jurisdiction. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 4; see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 180, 182 (1980)
(upholding an extension of the Voting Rights Act for seven years); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1976) (holding that legislation that deters or remedies constitutional
violations is within the scope of congressional enforcement power even if interferes with
an area of governance formerly reserved to the States); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
117-19 (1970) (upholding a nationwide ban on literacy tests as a voting requirement);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (stating that "[Section] Five is a positive
grant of legislative power"); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (up-
holding the suspension of literacy test as a requirement for voting under section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment).
The Court addressed the apparent discrepancy between cases interpreting the Enforce-
ment Clause as remedial and those seeming to read substantive authority into it by recon-
ciling the holdings in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), and Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966). See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2167-68. Even though the legislation
at issue in both cases addressed the states' power to govern elections granted in the Con-
stitution, the Court held that legislation aimed at remedying discrimination is within Con-
gress's enforcement power, see City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2168 (citing Morgan, 384 U.S.
641), whereas minor regulatory provisions such as age requirements are not. See City of
Boerne, 117 S. Ct at 2167 (citing Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 112 (holding that changing the voting
age in state and local elections from twenty-one to eighteen was beyond congressional en-
forcement power).
175. See id. at 2168-72 (comparing legislative ends to be achieved by RFRA with the
means adopted to do so).
176. See id. at 2169 (clarifying that "preventive" legislation may still be deemed ap-
propriate under the Enforcement Clause if the proportionality test is satisfied).
177. Id.
178. See id. at 2170. The Court explained that preventative congressional measures
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First, RFRA failed the proportionality test because of the difficulty of
refuting an individual's claim that his free exercise of religion has been
substantially burdened. Second, RFRA failed this test because once an
individual established that a law substantially burdened his right of free
exercise, RFRA would require the law in question to survive strict scru-
tiny review, the most stringent level of scrutiny in constitutional jurispru-
dence. O Finally, RFRA was not considered a proportional enforcement
of the Fourteenth Amendment because it affected all laws, not merely
those likely to unconstitutionally burden religious expression.' The
Court determined that RFRA so disproportionately protected religious
freedom at the expense of a state's ability to exercise its police powers
that it could not be considered responsive to unconstitutional behavior.'
The majority maintained that the primary problem with RFRA was its
sweeping scope.18 The Court noted that RFRA's broad language en-
abled it to be applied to every level of government and to almost every
type of law or official action, regardless of the subject matter.' The
Court distinguished RFRA from other legislation deemed within Con-
gress's enforcement power by showing that these other legislative meas-
ures were aimed at specific areas where and situations in which discrimi-
nation was historically prevalent.' Finally, the Court found that the
connection between the means chosen and the end achieved by RFRA
lacked the requisite proportionality because, under RFRA, anytime an
individual demonstrated that a law substantially burdened his free exer-
cise, the State would be forced to demonstrate that the law in question
advanced a compelling governmental interest and was implemented by
are appropriately deemed remedial when such measures anticipate actions that have a
"significant likelihood of being unconstitutional." See id.
179. See id. at 2171 (stating that RFRA's requirement of demonstrating a compelling
state interest every time an individual claims a substantial religious burden would place
stringent demands on state regulatory authority).
180. See id. (noting that imposing the highest level of judicial scrutiny on infringe-
ments of free exercise would lead to religious exemptions from almost any conceivable
civic duty).
181. See id. at 2170-71.
182. See id. at 2170.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id. (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966) (confining
the challenged provisions of the Voting Rights Act to regions of the country where dis-
crimination had been extensive); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (targeting
literacy tests that had long histories of denying voting rights based upon race); City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (limiting a provision requiring pre-
implementation review of changes in electoral practices by the Department of Justice to
areas with a tradition of discrimination)).
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the least restrictive means."' More importantly, the majority noted that
RFRA required this analysis even if the law in question was not intended
117to inhibit the free exercise of religion.
2. The Concurrences and Dissents: Justices Scalia and O'Connor Battle
Over the Scope of Free Exercise
Three Justices filed separate dissenting opinions in City of Boernels8 all
questioning the validity of Smith's refusal to extend the compelling inter-
est test.18 9 Justice O'Connor's dissent barely addressed whether RFRA
exceeded Congress's enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' 90 Rather, her fundamental difference with the majority holding
was not its analysis of the Enforcement Clause, but the Court's decision
in Smith.' 9' Justice O'Connor fully agreed with the Court's definition of
the scope of the Enforcement Clause as being remedial and not substan-
tive.' 9' She also stated that Congress lacked the power to define or ex-
pand the scope of constitutional rights, and that a remedial law must
have a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be pre-
vented and the means chosen to achieve the stated end.'9' Justice
O'Connor argued, however, that the Court's analysis of whether RFRA
was constitutionally enacted pursuant to Congress's powers under the
Enforcement Clause was dependent on the assumption that the Smith
decision correctly interpreted the Free Exercise Clause.94 Justice
186. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
187. See id. (noting that RFRA is not designed to remedy only laws likely to unconsti-
tutionally inhibit free exercise, but instead it may apply to laws that are not motivated by
any unconstitutional behavior).
188. Justice O'Connor filed a dissent with which Justice Breyer joined. See id. at 2176
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Souter filed a separate dissent. See id. at 2185 (Souter,
J., dissenting). Justice Breyer filed a separate dissent and concurred with all but the first
paragraph of Part I of Justice O'Connor's dissent. See id. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
189. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing ex-
pressly that Smith was wrongly decided); id. at 2185-86 (Souter, J., dissenting) (questioning
the soundness of the Smith rule, and suggesting briefing and argument on the merits of
that case); id. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to require the parties to
brief the question of whether Smith was correctly decided).
190. See id. at 2176-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The only portion of Justice
O'Connor's dissent that addressed congressional authority under section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment is the first paragraph of Part I. See id
191. See id. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
192. See id. (agreeing with the majority's contention that "Congress lacks the 'power
to decre:' the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States"').
193. See id.
194. See id. (stating that had she agreed with the Court's holding in Smith, she would
have joined the Majority in City of Boerne).
Enforcing the Enforcement Clause
O'Connor disagreed with that assumption.95
The concurring opinions, by Justices Scalia and Stevens did not add to
or elaborate on the central rationale of the majority.'96 Justice Scalia's
concurrence almost exclusively responded to and refuted the arguments
put forth by Justice O'Connor in her dissent.' Justice Stevens put forth,
195. See id. Justice O'Connor's dissent argued that the Free Exercise Clause is in fact
"an affirmative guarantee" of an individual's "right to participate in religious practices...
even [if] such [a practice] conflicts with a neutral, generally applicable law." Id. at 2177.
Justice O'Connor argued that the Court's prior jurisprudence employed the compelling
interest test regardless of whether a law was targeted at religion. See id.
A substantial portion of Justice O'Connor's dissent was devoted to an examination of
the historical origins of the Free Exercise Clause. See id. at 2176-85. She concluded that
at the time the Bill of Rights was drafted, the phrase "free exercise" was understood to
"require[], where possible, accommodation of religious practice." Id. at 2181. Justice
O'Connor's historical analysis focused on state charters and constitutions which made al-
lowances for the free exercise of religion. See id. at 2180 (quoting GA. CONST. art. LVI
(1777) ("All persons whatever shall have the free exercise of their religion; provided it be
not repugnant to the peace and safety of the State"); MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art.
XXXIII (1776) ("[N]o person ought by any law to be molested in his person or estate on
account of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his religious practice; unless, under
colour of religion, any man shall disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State, or shall
infringe the laws of morality, or injure others, in their natural, civil, or religious rights");
N.H. CONST. art. I. § 5 (1784) ("Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to
worship GOD according to the dictates of his own conscience, and reason; and no subject
shall be hurt, molested, or restrained in his person, liberty or estate for worshipping GOD,
in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience.... pro-
vided he doth not disturb the public peace, or disturb others, in their religious worship.");
N.Y. CONST. art. XXXVIII (1777) ("[T]he free exercise and enjoyment of religious pro-
fession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be al-
lowed, within this State, to all mankind: Provided, That the liberty of conscience, hereby
granted, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices in-
consistent with the peace or safety of this State.")). Justice O'Connor concluded that the
concept of free exercise was firmly embedded in several states prior to the adoption of the
Bill of Rights and, similar to the status afforded freedom of speech, it "should be treated
with the highest degree of respect." City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2182, 2185. Therefore,
Justice O'Connor concluded that even though Smith provides a bright line rule that neu-
tral laws of general applicability do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, the holding is
contrary to the constitutional protections intended for the free exercise of religion. See id.
at 2185.
196. See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens filed a concurring
opinion and Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, concurring in part.
197. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172-76. Justice Scalia dissected the text of each
of the historical examples put forth by O'Connor in support of her position. See id. at
2172-73. Justice Scalia noted that all of the free exercise enactments cited by the dissent
were specifically targeted at laws which singled out religious practices. See id. at 2172
(stating that all of the examples used in the dissent provide protection against actions that
are taken "for," "in respect of," "on account of," or "discriminatory" toward religion).
Accordingly, Justice Scalia held that the early free exercise enactments were inapplicable
to neutral, generally applicable laws, such as zoning laws. See id. Justice Scalia also
pointed out that each of the enactments cited in the dissent contained restrictive language
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however, an alternative and altogether different rationale-that RFRA
violated the First Amendment in that it was a "law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion.'
' 98
IV. CITY OF BOERNE V. FLORES: AN APPROPRIATE LIMIT ON
CONGRESS'S POWER
A. Enforcement Has Its Limits
RFRA's invalidation, although having a significant impact on an indi-
vidual's right to freely exercise his religion, was narrowly decided by ad-
dressing the appropriate scope of the Enforcement Clause. 99 The ma-
jority properly limited its decision to Congress's authority to enact
RFRA because the merits of the free exercise argument in City of
Boerne had been already addressed and decided in Smith.y° The Smith
decision clearly held that a state does not need to demonstrate a compel-
ling governmental interest to justify a neutral, generally applicable law.20'
Once the preliminary question of RFRA's constitutionality was an-
demonstrating that an individual's freedom to exercise religion was not absolute. See id.
(stating that the "provisos" in the enactments forbid one to act in a manner "unfaithful to
the Lord Proprietary" or "disturb[ing to] the public peace," or interfering with the "peace
[and] safety of th[e] State").
198. See id. at 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens's concurring opinion did
not address the Enforcement Clause or the proportionality test put forth by the majority.
See id. In a very brief opinion, he concluded that RFRA was a "law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion" and therefore violated the First Amendment. Id. Justice Stevens
reasoned that even if RFRA's enactment was within Congress's power, it would not have
provided relief from the city ordinance in Boerne, if the situation had been one where the
city denied a building permit for a museum or an art gallery owned by an atheist. See id.
Thus, according to Justice Stevens, RFRA provided religious organizations with a statu-
tory entitlement to an exemption from a neutral law of general applicability. See id. He
concluded that this exemption was an impermissible establishment of religion. See id.; see
also U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion ...."). Justice Stevens's concurrence illustrates the paradox created by the lan-
guage of the First Amendment in that it forbids Congress from inhibiting the free exercise
of religion while at the same time preventing Congress from favoring too heavily any par-
ticular religion. Cf City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, su-
pra note 7, § 17.1, at 1218 (discussing the "natural antagonism" between the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause).
199. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (stating that although Congress's power un-
der the Enforcement Clause is broad, RFRA disrupts the separation of powers and the
federal-state balance).
200. See generally Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 876-85 (1990) (discussing the meaning and scope of the Free Exercise Clause and
whether it provides for an exemption from laws of general applicability).
201. See id. at 885, 879 (holding Oregon's religion-neutral, generally applicable law
banning the ingestion of peyote and denying unemployment benefits for violating that
ban, did not require the State to justify the ban with a compelling governmental interest).
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swered adversely for the Archbishop, the merits of his free exercise claim
did not need to be addressed.202 The question to be decided was whether
the enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment enabled Con-
gress to reinstate a level of judicial scrutiny, which had been previously
ruled unconstitutional by the Court.0 3
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion was a textually sound interpreta-
tion of the Enforcement Clause. 4 Justice Kennedy appropriately de-
fined the scope of the Enforcement Clause within the overall structure of
the Constitution by reiterating the long-standing axiom that the Federal
201Government is one of enumerated powers. Justice Kennedy duly
noted that even though the Enforcement Clause "is 'a positive grant of
legislative power' to Congress,, 206 "'it is not unlimited. ' ' 2°7 Justice Ken-
nedy observed that if a particular measure enacted under the enforce-
ment power was substantive in nature rather that remedial, that measure
202. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160 (stating RFRA's constitutionality and the
Archbishop's reliance thereupon were the focus of the Supreme Court's review). After
the Smith decision, and prior to the enactment of RFRA, the neutral, generally applicable
zoning law at issue in City of Boerne would have passed the rational basis review man-
dated in Smith. Thus, without RFRA, the city would not have been required to justify its
ordinance with a compelling interest and the Archbishop would not have had a successful
argument for judicial relief.
203. See id. at 2172 (answering that the breadth of congressional enforcement power
does not encompass the authority to act contrary to a previously issued judicial interpreta-
tion of the Constitution). Although the purpose of RFRA was to increase the level of pro-
tection for religious freedom, the means of achieving that end was to re-establish the com-
pelling interest test articulated in Sherbert. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb - 2000bb-1 (1994).
204. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164 (holding that the power to "enforce" a pro-
vision does not imply the authority to substantively change the meaning of the provision
being enforced); see also infra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing the literal defi-
nition of the verb "enforce").
205. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2162 (citing M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819)). Justice Kennedy's analysis of the Enforcement Clause followed
a long standing two-step process of judicial review by (1) determining whether the Con-
gress's action was pursuant to a constitutional grant of power to the Federal Government,
then (2) determining whether the action violated another limit on federal power located
elsewhere in the Constitution. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 7, § 3.1, at 118. In
City of Boerne, RFRA failed the first prong of this analysis because the statute went be-
yond enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160 (con-
cluding RFRA exceeded Congress's power). RFRA violated the second prong of this
analysis because the separation of powers and federal-state balance principles provided
for elsewhere in the Constitution do not permit Congress to redefine the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 2172 (stating that each branch of government must
respect "the proper actions and determinations of the other branches").
206. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2163 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966)).
207. See id. (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)).
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would essentially create a new enumerated power.'O The majority ac-
knowledged that the difference between a substantive change and reme-
dial measure is not always easy to discern.'O As a result, the Court pro-
vided a workable proportionality test to determine whether congruence
and proportionality existed between "the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end."21
The Court correctly held that a legislative measure cannot be consid-
ered remedial or preventative if the measure lacks a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be remedied and the means chosen
to achieve the desired end.211  This requirement is appropriate because
without congruence and proportionality between the means and ends, a
measure would be necessarily breaking new ground by changing the sub-
stantive scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. 212  The Fourteenth
Amendment was specifically enacted to protect individuals against the
power of the States."' Further, the Enforcement Clause grants Congress
the power "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the
Fourteenth Amendment]., 214 Intuitively, the majority properly held that
RFRA cannot be "enforcing" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment unless RFRA in fact remedied or prevented unconstitutional viola-
tions of that Amendment. 5
In determining the appropriate limits of the Enforcement Clause, a
208. See id. at 2164 (stating that if Congress were given "the power to determine what
constitutes a constitutional violation... [it] would no longer be [enforcing] ... 'the provi-
sions of [the Fourteenth Amendment.]"' Compare id. at 2164 (citing South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)) (holding the enforcement power is limited to reme-
dial measures), with City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (agreeing
with the majority's analysis of the scope of the Enforcement Clause).
209. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. See id.; see also supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing the formal logic
employed by Justice Kennedy in confirming his definition of the Enforcement Clause);
infra note 215 and accompanying text (providing the formal definition of enforcement).
By way of explaining the enforcement/substantive distinction, a police officer enforces the
speed limit by ticketing a driver traveling 60 m.p.h. in a 45 m.p.h. zone; an officer substan-
tively lowers the speed limit by ticketing a driver going 40 m.p.h. in the same location.
213. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.") (emphasis added).
214. Id. amend. XIV, § 5.
215. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170. The definition of the word "enforce" im-
plies that the there is something already in place to enforce or buttress. See WEBSTER'S
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 412 (1983) (defining "enforce" as "to give force
to" or "to carry out effectively").
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distinction can be drawn between RFRA's attempt to regulate laws that
have a discriminatory effect on religious freedom without necessarily a
discriminatory purpose, and the election laws at issue in City of Rome."'
In City of Rome, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.217 The Court held that the enforcement power was
broad enough to regulate laws discriminatory in effect even if the aim of
the Fifteenth Amendment was only to guard against purposeful discrimi-
nation. 8 In City of Boerne, however, the Court held that RFRA failed
the proportionality test partially because it regulated laws that did not
evidence intentional discrimination, but which nonetheless had a dis-
criminatory effect."' This change in rationale indicates the Court's will-
ingness to curtail the expansive breadth of the enforcement power ar-
ticulated in Rome.20
Ultimately, the Court properly determined that RFRA's scope made it
a substantive law rather than a remedial one, as determined by the pro-
portionality test.22 RFRA was not a proportional remedy because its
sweeping scope did not correct a specific law or injustice nor was it di-
rected at a particular level of government or region of the country with a/. • .• 222
history of religious discrimination. A history of racial discrimination is
a permissible justification for remedial or preventive congressional ac-
tion.22 Moreover, although not specifically part of the Court's rationale,
216. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's expansion of
the enforcement power to cover discriminatory effects without discriminatory purpose).
217. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 159, 177 (1980).
218. See id. at 177.
219. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2171; see also supra notes 179-81 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the reasons RFRA lacked "congruence and proportionality").
220. Compare City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170 (noting that most of the "state laws to
which RFRA applies are not ones which will have been motivated by religious bigotry"),
with City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 177 (holding that the mere "risk of purposeful discrimina-
tion ... was [sufficient] to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact") (emphasis
added). The Court in City of Rome broadened its application of the Enforcement Clause
beyond purposeful discrimination to laws that risked being discriminatory. See City of
Rome, 446 U.S. at 158. The Court upheld the Voting Rights Act because it noted that
Congress could have rationally concluded that demonstrated past discrimination
amounted to a sufficient risk of purposeful discrimination. See id. This is a somewhat du-
bious finding due to the fact that the city of Rome demonstrated at the trial level that it
had not racially discriminated against voters in over 17 years. See id. at 195 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
221. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170.
222. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (outlining RFRA's provisions and
purposes).
223. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 182 (stating that "statutory remedies were necessary
to counter the perpetuation of 95 years of pervasive voting discrimination"); Mitchell, 400
U.S. at 132 ("In enacting the literacy test ban... Congress had before it a long history of
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RFRA's application to federal legislation 21 is arguably an overbroad use
of the Fourteenth Amendment because the Fourteenth Amendment is
221only applicable against the states.
B. The Dissent: An Ineffective Response
Justice O'Connor used her dissent in City of Boerne to reargue the
221merits of the Smith decision. In fact, Justice O'Connor agreed with the
majority's interpretation of the scope of the Enforcement Clause and the
use of the proportionality test to determine when a law is substantive
rather than remediala. Justice O'Connor held, however, that the major-
ity's holding in City of Boerne is premised on the assumption that Smith
provided a proper interpretation of the constitutional right to free exer-
128
cise.
The weakness in Justice O'Connor's argument, illuminated by Justice
Scalia, is her misguided reliance on the legislative history of the Free Ex-
the discriminatory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voters on account of their race.")
(opinion of Black, J.); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) ("The con-
stitutional propriety of [legislation adopted under the Enforcement Clause] must be
judged with reference to the historical experience... it reflects.").
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3 (1994). RFRA states in relevant part:
Applicability
In General
This [Act] applies to all Federal and State law, and the implementation of that
law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after No-
vember 16, 1993.
Rule of Construction
Federal statutory law adopted after November 16, 1993, is subject to this [Act]
unless such law explicitly excludes such application by reference to this [Act].
Id.
225. For an interesting argument that RFRA is unconstitutional because it encom-
passes federal legislation, and the Fourteenth Amendment is specifically limited to state
action, see Hamilton, supra note 21, at 372-375. Hamilton's argument relied on Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 605-06 (1990), overruled by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (stating that to the extent that
Metro Broadcasting is inconsistent with the holding that racial classifications by federal,
state, or local governmental actors must be subject to strict scrutiny, it is overruled), where
she points out that the language of the Fourteenth Amendment limits its applicability ex-
plicitly to state action. See id. at 372-73. Hamilton also notes that an early draft of the
Fourteenth Amendment provided: "'No discrimination shall be made by any State, nor by
the United States, as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude."' See id. at 374. As evidenced by the current language of the amend-
ment, however, the reference to the United States was removed prior to ratification. See
id.
226. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2176-79, 2185.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 2176.
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ercise Clause.219  Every historical example cited in Justice O'Connor's
dissent, in an effort to show the strong foundation of the meaning of
"free exercise" at the time of ratification of the Bill of Rights, contained
a provision limiting the scope of the phrase. 30 The common thread
throughout each of the enactments providing for the right to free exer-
cise of religion is that each stopped short of granting an unlimited rightS 231
to free exercise. Each example provided for a right to practice one's
religion as long as that practice did not violate other civil laws.232 Al-
though Justice O'Connor argued that RFRA was constitutional because
Smith was wrongly decided, her historical citations supported Smith by
demonstrating that general societal laws have always limited the free ex-
ercise of religion.233
Justice O'Connor inadequately considered the separation of powers
and the federal structure provided for in the Constitution. 34 Her dissent
placed the right to free exercise above a state's ability to enact neutral,
generally applicable laws pursuant to its police power and above the ju-
diciary's role as the supreme interpreter of the Constitution.21' Her ar-
229. See id. at 2172-74 (Scalia, J., concurring) (illustrating that each free exercise pro-
vision relied on by Justice O'Connor in her dissent contained a clause stating that the right
to free exercise of religion is limited by an individual's duty to obey societal laws).
230. See id. at 2179-81.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's critique of
Justice O'Connor's "misguided" argument).
234. For a detailed look at the RFRA's unconstitutionality based on a separation of
powers argument, see Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at its Word. The Impli-
cations for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5, 13-30 (1995). Professor
Brant argues that RFRA is unconstitutional because Congress did not honor the Court's
declaration of the its own limitations in Smith. See id. at 6. Brant argues that Smith was
decided on "institutional competence" grounds, that is, the Court held that the judiciary
was ill-equipped to determine the necessity for religious exemptions from civil laws. See
id. at 22-23.
For a strong argument in support of RFRA's unconstitutionality based on federalism
grounds, see Kruse, supra note 17, at 426-30. Kruse develops a thorough review of mod-
ern Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, and concludes that RFRA was an unconstitutional
violation of state sovereignty. See id. at 408-30.
235. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2177. Although not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall articulated the meaning of the states' "police power"
as follows: "[T]hat immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the
territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government: all of which can be most
advantageously exercised by the States themselves." See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat) 1,203 (1824).
Admittedly, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the rationale in Smith. See City of Boerne,
117 S. Ct. at 2176. Her opinion, however, failed to adequately address the fact that Con-
gress directly overturned a Supreme Court decision. Following her dissent, one is left to
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gument is not compelling enough to undue these two long-standing can-
ons of our country's constitutional jurisprudence.
C. The Constitution Must Not Be Ignored
In determining the correctness of the decision in City of Boerne, it is
helpful to examine the possibility of an alternate holding. The dissent's
approach advocates the popular position that government should not un-
reasonably burden religious practices even through general nondiscrimi-
236
natory laws. If, however, the Court allowed strict scrutiny to be ap-
plied to any law that substantially burdens religious expression, the
Court would be faced with an unworkable task. Because courts are ill-
equipped to determine the "centrality" of an individual's religious be-
liefs, this would allow almost any religious expression to effectively nul-
lify nearly any law in its applicability to particular citizens. 1 7
The Court's willingness to examine the alternative possibility that
RFRA, if left in place, would have allowed practically limitless invalida-
tion of generally applicable laws is reminiscent of a similar rationale put
forth in United States v. Lopez.238 In Lopez, the Court considered the
possibility that upholding the Gun-Free School Zones Act under the
Commerce Clause would endorse almost limitless federal power, even in
areas such as criminal law enforcement. 39 Following this rationale, if
RFRA were upheld under the Enforcement Clause, Congress would in
effect be prohibiting the states from regulating the criminal and non-
criminal activity of citizens who claimed particular laws infringed upon
their free exercise rights.
240
City of Boerne, however, deals also with an important issue aside from
the interplay between state authority and freedom of religion. City of
Boerne directly addresses whether Congress can overrule the Supreme
assume that Congress has a veto power over the Court.
236. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2176 (Scalia, J., concurring).
237. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Serv. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887-88
(1990). The Court reaffirmed that "[iit is not within the judicial ken to question the cen-
trality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' in-
terpretations of those creeds." Id. at 887 (quoting Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S.
680, 699 (1989)). Therefore, because courts cannot determine centrality, the compelling
interest test would have to be applied uniformly resulting in "constitutionally required re-
ligious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind." See id. at 888.
238. 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (stating if the Court "were to accept the Government's
arguments,... [the Court would be] hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual
that Congress is without power to regulate").
239. See id. at 551, 564.
240. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2171 (concluding that RFRA infringes too much
upon states' general regulatory power).
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1 41Court's interpretation of the Constitution. Such an infringement is
simply impermissible under the separation of powers doctrine mandated
• • 242
by the Constitution. Permitting congressional review of Supreme
Court decisions would be an unacceptable violation of the Constitution's
requirement of separation of powers 4' and the doctrine of judicial re-
view 44 established by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.245
To permit RFRA's congressional reinterpretation of the Court's defini-
tion of free exercise, as put forth in Smith, would be to redistribute the
separation of force, will, and judgment articulated by Alexander Hamil-
ton in the Federalist Papers. 4 The decision in City of Boerne is an ap-
241. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
242. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court .... " Id. art. III, § 1. The judiciary is charged with re-
solving all cases and controversies "arising under th[e] Constitution, [and] the Laws of the
United States." Id., art. III., § 2. It is the province of the judiciary to say what the law is.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). In City of Boerne, the Court
stated that "experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when each part of
government respects both the Constitution and the proper actions and determinations of
the other branches." City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172. The separation of powers refers to
the partition of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the
Federal Government, as set forth in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I (granting all
enumerated legislative powers of the Federal Government to the Congress); id. art. II
(vesting all executive powers of the Federal Government in the President); id. art. III
(vesting the judicial power of the Federal Government in one Supreme Court and in other
inferior courts that may be established by Congress).
243. Scholars have also held that it is beyond the constitutional authority of Congress
to reverse the Court in matters of judicial competence. See Brant, supra note 234, at 21.
244. Judicial review is the often controversial notion that the Supreme Court of the
United States has the power to declare laws unconstitutional. See GUNTHER &
SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 13 (describing the controversy as to whether the judicial re-
view asserted by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury was a usurpation of power). Judge
Learned Hand makes a notable argument that judicial review is a mere interpolation of
the text of the Constitution. See id. at 18. Professor Wechsler, on the other hand, finds
textual support for judicial review in the Supremacy Clause of Article IV and in Article
III. See id.
245. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. Chief Justice Marshall articulated the ex-
istence of judicial review by examining first whether William Marbury indeed had a right
to assert. See id. at 154-62. Second, after Marshall determined that Marbury did indeed
have a right to his judicial appointment, Marshall explored whether a remedy existed for
Marbury. See id. at 162-68. Ultimately, Marshall assumed that it was the duty of the judi-
ciary to resolve conflicts between laws enacted by Congress and the written Constitution.
See id. at 177. Probably the strongest historical antecedent supporting Marshall's vision of
judicial review are the words of Alexander Hamilton who wrote, "The judiciary.., has no
influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the
wealth of society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have
neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment." See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465
(Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke, ed. 1961).
246. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522-23 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed.,
1961).
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241propriate and necessary assertion of judicial authority over Congress.
V. CANCELING THE BLANK CHECK: THE COURT RESTRICTS
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
City of Boerne is the most recent addition to an expanding collection of
Supreme Court decisions that are depleting the traditionally vast reser-
voirs of congressional authority.248 The decision in City of Boerne was
necessary to maintain the separation of powers because nothing in the
Constitution allows Congress to substitute its interpretation of the Con-
stitution for that of the Supreme Court's, particularly after the Court has
249decided a specific controversy. If Congress wants to ensure greater
protection of the right to the free exercise of religion, it must follow the
strictures of the Constitution by creating an amendment.5'
Congress's attempts to broaden its reach by expanding the scope of its
enumerated powers25' have initiated this trend in Supreme Court juris-
prudence reining in congressional excess.252 Although some of Con-
gress's motives may seem altruistic,2 3 the internal limits of the Enforce-
247. See United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 685, 691 (5th Cir. 1997) (DeMoss, J., dis-
senting) (supporting a renewed attention to constitutional limits on the powers of the Fed-
eral Government, a return to the role of federalism in constitutional analysis, and in-
creased respect for the separation of powers), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S. Ct. 1189 (1998).
248. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court decisions
that curtail congressional commerce power).
249. The judicial power extends to all cases and controversies. See U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2. The Court has articulated that the Constitution is best preserved when each
branch of government respects the determinations of the other branches. See City of
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997). In City of Boerne, the Court reiterated that
the Judicial Branch is responsible for interpreting the Constitution and saying what the
law is. See id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). The City of
Boerne Court went further by stating that stare decisis binds the Court to follow its prece-
dents and not subsequent congressional actions contrary to its decisions. See id.
250. See U.S. CONST. art. V. In fact the decision in City of Boerne has prompted new
debate over a proposed Religious Freedom Amendment. Rep. Ernest Istook, R-Okla.,
has renewed his effort to enact the following amendment: "The people's right to pray and
to recognize their religious beliefs, heritage or traditions on public property, including
schools, shall not be infringed." Lisa Clagett Weintraub, "Religious Freedom" Debate Re-
newed, Congressional Quarterly's Washington Alert, May 8, 1997.
251. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing expansive congressional
legislation enacted under the Enforcement and Commerce Clauses).
252. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court decisions
limiting Congress's power in historically deferential areas such as the Commerce Clause,
the Tenth Amendment, and the Enforcement Clause); see also supra note 17 and accom-
panying text (presenting some of the specific congressional enactments which led to this
restrictive judicial trend).
253. See Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A)-(B) (1994)
(prohibiting possession of firearms within a school zone); Brady Handgun Violence Pre-
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ment and Commerce Clauses, along with the explicit restrictions of the
Tenth Amendment, cannot be ignored. 4 Congress remains an elected
body, subject to the will, and potentially the tyranny, of the majority,5 '
and thus should not be granted leeway merely because it appears to be
protecting rather than attacking a constitutional right.256 The Constitu-
tion supports this position with explicit language prohibiting Congress
from involving itself in matters of religion.
vention Act, Pub. L. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (commanding state and local law en-
forcement officials to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers).
254. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The powers of the
legislature are defined, and limited; and that those [sic] limits may not be mistaken [sic], or
forgotten, the constitution [sic] is written."); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct.
2157, 2172 (1997) (stating that the best way to preserve the Constitution is for each branch
of government to honor the respective roles of the other branches). In City of Boerne, the
Court held that Congress may not substitute congressional interpretation of the Constitu-
tion for that of the Court because it is the Judicial Branch that has the duty to say what the
law is. See id. The Court's decisions in Printz and Lopez illustrate the recent Supreme
Court trend of restricting Congress's overbroad interpretations of its own powers. See su-
pra note 23 and accompanying text. In New York v. United States, the Court recognized
that the expansive powers granted to Congress through the Commerce Clause are still
subject to the limits of the Tenth Amendment. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 156-57 (1992). The New York Court specified that the Commerce Clause authorizes
Congress to directly regulate commerce, however, it does not permit Congress to dictate
how state governments should regulate commerce. See id. at 166; see also Kruse, supra
note 17, at 426 (quoting Memorandum of Law in Support of State Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss at 47, Muhammad v. Coughlin, 91 Civ. 6333 (S.D.N.Y. July 1994) as stating
"RFRA impermissibly requires the States to exercise their basic police powers in a man-
ner consistent with Congress' view of wise public policy. If the Tenth Amendment means
anything, it means that Congress may not force the States to act as its satellite and carry
out its unstructured legislative goals.").
255. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 114-22 (Richard D.
Heffner ed., New American Library 1984). Alexis de Tocqueville wrote eloquently about
the "tyranny of the majority" in the United States after visiting from France in 1831-32.
See id. at 9. Democracy in America is an important work in understanding the necessity of
having limits on congressional power.
Professor Hamilton also puts forth a strong argument as to why Congress is not the ap-
propriate protector of individual liberties. See Hamilton, supra note 21, at 396-97. Hamil-
ton writes that institutionally speaking, Congress, as opposed to the judiciary, is particu-
larly inclined to be negligent of individual liberties. See id. She aptly argues that
Congress's national, result-oriented focus makes it ill-equipped to consider adequately
individual's needs which are not pertinent to the nation as a whole, or those needs which
may be out of the mainstream. See id. Alternatively, Hamilton states that due to the judi-
ciary's duty to handle cases and controversies, courts focus narrowly upon individuals
whose freedoms have been affected by comprehensive legislation. See id. at 397.
256. See Hamilton, supra note 21, at 378-86 (stating that Congress, through sophisti-
cated drafting and political rhetoric, can be repressive while appearing to protect liberty,
and "if one is willing to lower the enumerated power barrier for Congress when it is at-
tempting to improve on liberties, an immediate line-drawing problem arises").
257. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress" shall not establish, nor prohibit the free
exercise of religion); see also Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties With the First Amendment:
1998]
Catholic University Law Review
Recognition of this restrictive trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence
toward Congress was noted soon after the Court's decision in New York
v. United States.2" There was some conjecture among constitutional
scholars that the decision in New York suggested that a majority of Jus-
tices may possess a willingness to give states immunity from generally
applicable laws that constitute a severe burden on the state's ability to
perform traditional functions.259 There is now speculation that this trend
will lead to the invalidation of other laws enacted under the Enforcement
Clause, such as the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
(FACE).26
This restrictive trend is evident in three distinct areas of Supreme
Court jurisprudence: the Commerce Clause,"261 the Tenth Amendment,
and the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.263 Although
this movement by the Court is most clearly apparent in the Court's deci-
sions circumscribing Congress's historically broad-based Commerce
Clause authority,6 the trend is also plainly apparent in the Court's will-
ingness to revitalize the Tenth Amendment.2 65 With the addition of City
of Boerne, it is reasonable to assume that this restrictive trend has ex-
panded to the Enforcement Clause as well. Taken together, this marks a
significant reduction in congressional power. Congress may no longer
ignore the strictures of the Tenth Amendment and pass practically any
Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539,
1628-29 (1995). Bybee makes a cogent point that the First Amendment is specifically re-
strictive of Congress, rather than generally restrictive of the Federal Government. See id.
at 1628. Bybee also argues that Congress's section 5 power does not supersede its First
Amendment limitations. See id. at 1628-29. In other words, the Enforcement Clause only
permits enforcement of those rights incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, as-
suming arguendo that the Fourteenth Amendment does incorporate First Amendment
rights, Congress is still left without authority to act. See id. This leaves the federal judici-
ary as the appropriate branch of the Federal Government to determine the level of protec-
tion to be afforded to the free exercise of religion. See id.
258. 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 7, at 170 (ques-
tioning whether the decision in New York might indicate the Court's willingness to protect
the states from burdensome generally applicable federal legislation).
259. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 7, at 170.
260. See United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 685, 691 (5th Cir. 1998) (DeMoss, J., dis-
senting) (asserting that FACE violates the Enforcement Clause as defined in City of
Boerne), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S. Ct. 1189 (1998).
261. See discussion supra Part I.
262. See id.
263. See discussion supra Part II.
264. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decisions in
Printz v. United States, United States v. Lopez, and New York v. United States).
265. See Kruse, supra note 17, at 426-30 (discussing the Court's strengthening of the
Tenth Amendment with its decisions in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, New York v. United States, and Gregory v. Aschcroft).
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form of legislation under the justification that the activity to be regulated
affects interstate commerce. 2" The decision in City of Boerne suggests
that with the doors of the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment
closing, Congress will not be able to turn to the Enforcement Clause as
an escape. The Court has made it clear with City of Boerne that the En-
forcement Clause will be limited to those congressional actions that "en-
force" the protections already guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and will not allow Congress to make substantive changes in those
protections merely by claiming its actions are appropriate legislation.67
After the Court's decision in City of Boerne, it remains permissible, al-
though not required, for states to provide religious exemptions to neutral
laws of general applicability.268 If religious exemptions are not granted,
this may in fact disadvantage religious practices that do not enjoy wide
support.269 The alternative, however, is unacceptable uncertainty. Al-
though tempting, convenience or good intentions should never be a justi-
fication for violating constitutional mandates. The Constitution is flexi-
ble and may be interpreted, but it should not be changed at the will of an
elected body.27
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in City of Boerne is a step in the right direction. By
keeping Congress's authority under the Enforcement Clause in check,
the Court maintained the separation of powers between the legislature
and the judiciary, and the balance of power between the Federal Gov-
ernment and the States. By enforcing the Enforcement Clause, the
Court has added a third prong to its trend toward closer regulation of
congressional action. A constrained commerce power, a stronger Tenth
Amendment, and an Enforcement Clause strictly confined to remedial
measures provides three separate methods for the Court to rein in Con-
266. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing the modern limits of the
Commerce Clause).
267. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997) (stating that legislation
that alters the substantive protections of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be said to be
"enforcing" the Amendment).
268. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890
(1990).
269. See id.; see also Bybee, supra note 257, at 1631. Bybee postulates that Smith,
prior to the enactment of RFRA, does not necessarily mean greater restrictions on the
free exercise of religion. See id. Bybee states that the Court's position in Smith, assures
less interference with state laws, which allows the states to protect religious freedom under
their own constitutions. See id.
270. See supra note 255 and accompanying text (discussing de Tocqueville's warnings
against an unchecked majority).
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gress. The decision in City of Boerne permits the States to preserve their
ability to legislate for the health and welfare of their citizens under the
constitutionally reserved police powers. More importantly, however,
City of Boerne sustains the Supreme Court's role as arbitrator of all cases
and controversies and as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
